

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-345

17 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/PTOS

ATTENTION: C/TSD/OS

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Moscow Security [REDACTED]


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1. Attached for your information is a copy of a letter from [REDACTED] to Karl Ackerman at State asking that a list of all U.S. personnel who work on or with construction of the new U.S. Embassy in the USSR be compiled and maintained. George also solicits Karl's agreement that the list be accessible for counterintelligence purposes associated with threats of technical penetration. The proposal is that the DCI member of the SECOM Security Advisory Group USSR work out procedures for such access if Mr. Ackerman agrees with the concept. [REDACTED]

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2. I will ask [REDACTED] of the SECOM staff, who is the DCI member of that group, to follow through on this and to maintain close liaison with [REDACTED]. We will ensure that you are kept informed of any information relating to technical penetration threats against our embassy. [REDACTED]

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
Attachment

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Office of the Director of Central Intelligence  
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200040015-1  
Washington, D.C. 20505



16 September 1980

Mr. Karl D. Ackerman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Security  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Karl:

With the advent of active construction of the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow and our mutual concern for current and longer range security of this endeavor, I request that your office undertake to compile and maintain a total list of all U.S. personnel (government and non-government) who are in any way involved with the construction or related activities in the USSR. [redacted]

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This list should include the names and appropriate information on all personnel utilized in supervision, security monitoring, construction, contractor representation, inspection, and escorting of materials in shipment. Inasmuch as many personnel will rotate in and out of Moscow for short periods during the total years of the construction effort, I expect that the comprehensive listing requested herein will include every such person. [redacted]

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Various concerned elements of the national counterintelligence community, in conjunction with the DCI's Security Advisory Group on Moscow and your office, will continue active efforts to maintain security of the new Embassy, particularly against the threat of technical penetration. As a part of these efforts, it may be necessary to interview or seek assistance from personnel who have been on the Moscow site in particular capacities at certain periods of time. Therefore, I would hope that the list you are requested to maintain will be available for legitimate counterintelligence inquiries in accordance with mutually agreed procedures. [redacted]

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If you concur in this request, we will work through the DCI member of the Security Advisory Group to effect necessary procedures. [redacted]

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
Sincerely,



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Special Assistant to the DCI  
for Counterintelligence

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